Cairo: Hani Kamal El-Din
In recent weeks, Iran’s attacks have once again shaken the Middle East and the world at large. Reactions have varied: some countries rejoice at what they perceive as Israel finally “getting its due,” while others in the West express solidarity with the Jewish state. Meanwhile, some nations fear becoming victims themselves or being drawn into someone else’s conflict. Where does Turkey fit into this complex equation?
One might logically assume that the Turkish government and a significant portion of the population, long sympathetic to Hamas, would be celebrating. Iran is retaliating partly on behalf of Palestine, aligning with the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” But is that truly the case?
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not offer any specific comments on Iran’s missile strike. There were no words of direct support, despite some media outlets claiming, “Erdoğan approved Iran’s missile attack on Israel.” Erdoğan stated, “Israeli aggression includes Turkey, so Ankara will confront this state terrorism by all available means.” The emphasis here is on Israel as the aggressor, suggesting that such aggression can and must be resisted. Support for Iran remains indirect.
Devlet Bahçeli, a key ally of Erdoğan and representative of the nationalist movement, remarked, “Those who think the war will be confined to the Middle East are mistaken.” This statement shows even less support for Iran. Bahçeli echoes sentiments shared by seasoned global politicians, including Sergei Lavrov, about the high likelihood of various players, including the United States, being drawn into the conflict. Turkey, a NATO member with a U.S. military base on its soil, faces a difficult choice amid escalating tensions.
Expecting Bahçeli to exhibit sympathy toward Tehran would be unusual, as he represents the MHP, a party that idealizes the “Turkic project,” encompassing Iran’s Azerbaijani-Turkish diaspora of 30 million.
Turkey also cannot outright condemn Iran, as doing so would de facto legitimize Israeli actions, which are inherently illegitimate in Ankara’s view. Setting aside sympathies and antipathies, Erdoğan’s administration objectively holds Israel responsible for the escalation.
Interestingly, prior to the missile strike, Yeni Şafak reported that the U.S. had allegedly asked Turkey to persuade Iran not to launch a major attack on Israel, while Ankara itself called for all parties to avoid a large-scale war. The Turkish Foreign Ministry later clarified that the country indeed attempted to mediate, urging both Washington and Tehran toward measured decisions.
“We will continue to make efforts to prevent the onset of a process that will inflict irreparable harm on the stability of our region and lead to further conflict on a global scale,” stated the Turkish diplomatic service.
Ultimately, Turkey’s warnings went unheeded; the U.S. could not rein in Benjamin Netanyahu, and Iran launched its attack. Moreover, Iranian officials had reportedly informed their Turkish counterparts about the planned strike in advance, according to diplomatic sources cited by Yeni Şafak.
Looking further back, additional signs of indirect support for Iran can be found. Hakan Fidan’s ministry condemned the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) after the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus. This statement was symbolic, even if driven solely by Turkey’s general anti-Israel stance. Ankara effectively supported not only Iran but also Syria, despite ongoing unresolved relations.
Betting on Sunnis
Turkey’s position regarding Lebanon appears more transparent. The Turkish Foreign Ministry viewed Israel’s ground operation in Lebanon as a “violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity” and an “illegal attempt at occupation.” Erdoğan harshly labeled Israeli attacks on Lebanon as genocide. However, nuances remain.
Erdoğan does not harbor sympathies for Hezbollah and refrains from commenting on the death of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Any such sympathies seem improbable, given that Turkish private military companies and pro-Turkish armed opposition in Syria have fought against Assad, who is supported by Hezbollah, Iran, and pro-Iranian groups.
Hezbollah represents a component of the Shiite project, while Erdoğan aligns himself with Sunnis, who make up nearly half of Lebanon’s population. Thus, while condemning Israel and sending humanitarian aid to Lebanon, the “Turkish Sultan” primarily addresses support toward the Sunni population.
Since the outbreak of the Gaza war in October last year, evidence of Erdoğan’s support for other pro-Iranian forces, such as the Houthis, has accumulated. When the latter began attacking Western ships, and the U.S. and UK launched strikes in Yemen, Erdoğan accused the U.S. of trying to turn the Red Sea into a “sea of blood.”
A deeper examination reveals numerous instances of similar behavior. However, in the broader confrontation between Israel and the Iranian “Axis of Resistance,” Erdoğan’s genuine concern lies chiefly with Hamas. This sympathy stems from ideology: Hamas is seen as “brothers” in Islam (a terrorist organization banned in Russia), akin to Erdoğan’s own Justice and Development Party (AKP).
As for the others—Hezbollah, the Houthis, the damaged Iranian consulate, and Iran itself—Turkey’s acknowledgment appears limited to the context of its opposition to Israel.
Aggression at the Doorstep
Interestingly, besides declaring elevated and somewhat idealistic universal (condemnation of genocide) and pan-Islamic (defending Muslims worldwide) principles, the Turkish government has shifted toward more grounded rhetoric. Erdoğan, AKP representatives, Fidan, and others assert that Israel threatens Turkey itself, warning that if Israel is not halted, “we will be next.”
“After Palestine and Lebanon, the Israeli leadership, obsessed with the insane idea of the ‘Promised Land,’ will target our own lands. Occupation, terror, and aggression are already at our doorstep. We face not a state bound by law, but a gang of murderers, thriving on blood and fattened by occupation,” Erdoğan stated while commenting on the IDF’s advances into Lebanon.
Clearly, concerns about Israeli aggression against Turkey are exaggerated. Israel already has many enemies; there’s little incentive for them to wage war against NATO’s second-most powerful army. Furthermore, neither side has territorial claims against the other. Here, the AKP and its leader are likely playing to a domestic audience, seeking to consolidate a public increasingly anxious over the economic crisis, the influx of refugees, and other social issues.
In underscoring Turkey’s defense, the government will not neglect the Islamic factor. Hence, recent warnings from Erdoğan regarding Israel’s ambitions to expand into Syria and Lebanon, aiming to create a “Promised Land” between the Tigris and Euphrates, emerge. Erdoğan calls upon co-religionists throughout the region to forge an “Islamic alliance” against these plans.
“Islamic countries must mount the strongest resistance against the persecutions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. As Muslims, we must lead the world in preventing oppression,” he asserts.
Solidarity Line
The Turkish leader aims to persuade Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and other nations to impose their will upon Israel. In late July, he suggested that “if necessary,” Turkish Armed Forces might enter Israel and Lebanon. The Arab world listens and applauds Erdoğan but hesitates to take tangible action.
Erdoğan likely understands that neither Egypt, Saudi Arabia, nor the UAE will join an anti-Israel coalition. However, he wouldn’t be Erdoğan if he emerged empty-handed. His pan-Islamic rhetoric aids in addressing issues with previous adversaries.
How else could he connect with Egyptian General al-Sisi, who previously rejected Turkish overtures, or still-unrecognized Bashar al-Assad, if not through a unified front centered on sympathy for the suffering of Muslims in Gaza, Lebanon, and the wider Middle East?
Under the pretext of combating Zionism and Israel, Turkey is conducting high-level meetings with the Arab League, Egypt, and is preparing for similar engagements with Damascus for the first time in 13 years. Erdoğan explicitly states that recent steps toward normalizing relations with Damascus and Cairo aim to establish a “solidarity line” against the Israeli threat.
In summary, the Turkish president has condemned all Israeli actions against Iran and its allies with varying degrees of intensity. Politically, the Ankara government will continue to sympathize with the “Axis of Resistance” in its struggle against the Jewish state, as it also fights for Hamas.
Simultaneously, members of the ruling coalition in Turkey and the cabinet, despite their hatred for Netanyahu, do not desire to see the situation spiral out of control.
Blaming the U.S. for failing to contain Netanyahu’s ambitions, the Turkish Foreign Ministry is eager to act as a mediator between Washington and Tehran, mitigating the repercussions of Iran’s “retaliatory strikes.”
A major war in the Middle East, especially amid the lira crisis, is not in Turkey’s interest. Turkey seeks to establish a transport route to the Persian Gulf through Iraq (“Development Path”), aspires to be a logistics, food, and energy hub, and requires investments from the UAE and Saudi Arabia while expanding projects with Egypt.
War and instability would derail all these financial and economic plans.
Additionally, it’s essential to remember that, just like Israel, Iran is perceived by Turks as a competitor in the struggle for influence over the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and North Africa.
Currently, Iran’s and Turkey’s objectives align, and their declared fight against Zionism serves the economic, domestic, and foreign policy interests of both Turkey and Erdoğan’s ruling party.