At one level, the vision outlines the broad contours of what India’s armed forces should look like by the centenary of independence, namely three pillars: technologically advanced, fully integrated across services, and capable of operating across multiple domains, including cyber, underwater and space. More fundamentally, however, it recognises that national power in the twenty-first century will depend as much on industrial capacity and technological ecosystems as on the battlefield capability.
The timing of the announcement in 2026 may suggest a newly conceived roadmap. In reality, the groundwork began several years earlier. The introduction of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020, the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the development of defence industrial corridors and the move toward theatre commands (North, Western and Maritime), alongside renewed emphasis on Make in India and Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) in defence manufacturing, marked a significant policy shift. These reforms aimed to reduce dependence on external suppliers while encouraging domestic production, innovation and private-sector participation, including collaboration with foreign firms.
In many ways, the Defence Vision 2047 represents the strategic culmination of these earlier initiatives. What began as a procurement reform is gradually evolving into a broader attempt to reshape India’s defence ecosystem.
This transformation is unfolding in a rapidly changing global security environment. Operation Sindoor, conflicts in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh and West Asia have demonstrated that modern wars are unlikely to remain short or geographically contained. Instead, they are increasingly protracted, technology-driven, narrative building and industrial in character. In such conflicts, the ability to sustain military operations through large-scale production of weapons, drones, electronic systems, countering mis/disinformation, working of diplomacy, cybersecurity and data networks becomes as important as battlefield tactics.
For India, this shift carries important implications. Over the past decade and more recently during Operation Sindoor, India’s armed forces have made notable progress in enhancing precision capabilities. Advances in missile technology, surveillance platforms and networked command structures have strengthened operational effectiveness. Yet modern warfare increasingly demands not only precision but also scale. The capacity to manufacture and deploy large volumes of systems (both cheap and effective), from unmanned platforms to electronic warfare tools, often determines the outcome of prolonged conflicts. The West Asia conflict offers these insights, where all the three warring parties and others are manufacturing and storing huge cache of arms to be used as and when required, as is happening right now This brings the economic and technological dimensions of Defence Vision 2047 into sharper focus.
India’s defence budget reflects the growing importance attached to this transformation. The latest Union Budget allocated ?7.85 lakh crore to defence, the highest among all ministries and a notable increase over previous years. Such investments recognise that military capability must be supported by a robust industrial base capable of designing, manufacturing and sustaining advanced systems.However, the journey toward self-reliance also presents a striking paradox. Despite sustained policy efforts to promote indigenous manufacturing, India continues to remain the world’s second-largest importer of arms only after Ukraine, between 2021 and 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) March 2026 report, accounting for around 8.2 per cent of global imports. For a country seeking to build a self-reliant defence ecosystem, this reality underscores the scale of the challenge ahead.
Part of this dependence stems from historical procurement patterns, not so successful missions like the Kaveri Project and the long gestation cycles associated with defence manufacturing. Building domestic capability in complex sectors such as aerospace, naval systems and advanced electronics requires sustained investment, policy stability and close collaboration between the state, industry and research institutions. One cannot ignore foreign companies as partners in this endeavour. Subject to their government approvals, many in the west are courting Indian establishment to invest in India for both local consumption and exports to the third countries.
One area that will require greater and more serious emphasis is defence research and development. Compared with major military powers, India’s R&D spending remains relatively modest. Recent comparative estimates suggest that China spends roughly $44.4 billion annually on defence R&D around 15 per cent of its $296 billion military budget, while India’s allocation to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) stands at roughly $2.8 billion, or about 3.35 per cent of its $83.6 billion defence spending.
Beyond defence alone, India’s overall research spending remains pitifully below 0.7 per cent of GDP, significantly lower than major military powers such as China (~2.5%), the US (~3.5%), France (~2.2%), Israel (~6.2%), Japan (~3.2%) or even Russia (~1.1%). Strengthening research ecosystems and encouraging collaboration between research organisations, academia, start-ups and private industry will therefore be the fourth critical pillar of the Vision 2047 of Viksit Bharat framework.
Encouragingly, recent policy directions indicate that India is beginning to address some of these structural gaps. Alongside traditional defence partners such as the United States, France, Israel and Russia, India may also benefit from diversifying cooperation with emerging partners, including Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria and countries in the Gulf region—for imports, exports and co-production.
If India’s defence exports are to expand meaningfully, however, greater outreach and narrative building will also be essential. Many countries across the Global South are actively searching for reliable and affordable defence partners. India must position itself within this space through sustained diplomatic engagement, defence exhibitions, business-to-business roundtables, Indian missions abroad outreach programmes and technology partnerships.
Such outreach will also support the growth of India’s defence industrial ecosystem, particularly Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), which increasingly forms the backbone of supply chains in aerospace, electronics and precision manufacturing. For these firms to scale up, they require predictable demand and credible export opportunities; otherwise, they risk remaining confined to sporadic or small-volume orders.
The growing focus on emerging technologies such as drones, artificial intelligence and geospatial systems indicates an attempt to align defence planning with the realities of future warfare. Across global battlefields, unmanned systems have already proven to be powerful force multipliers capable of altering operational dynamics at relatively low cost. It is good to hear that General Atomics of the USA has tied up with Larsen and Toubro to make drones in India.
So much about aerial equipment, one cannot ignore the maritime dimension. With the Indo-Pacific emerging as the central theatre of global geopolitical competition, and the Indian Ocean region effectively India’s strategic backyard, the security of sea lanes and maritime infrastructure has acquired renewed importance. India’s ability to safeguard these routes will depend on sustained naval modernisation, including stronger underwater capabilities and maritime surveillance systems. Once again, the West Asia conflict helps us to deal with the latest.
Beyond platforms and technologies, Defence Vision 2047 also signals a shift toward greater institutional integration within the armed forces. Efforts to enhance jointness through theatre commands and integrated operational planning reflect the reality that future conflicts will be fought across multiple domains simultaneously.
The path ahead will not be without challenges. Bridging the gap between aspiration and capability will require sustained policy commitment, stronger research and development, industrial depth, global and domestic outreach and the easing of bureaucratic constraints.
Yet the vision provides a clear strategic direction. If the reforms initiated with DAP 2020 and Operation Sindoor laid the groundwork, the coming decades will determine whether India can translate that foundation into a fully integrated defence-industrial ecosystem, an essential step for a country aspiring to shape the strategic landscape of the twenty-first century, and simultaneously create new jobs.
Views expressed by authors are personal. Pradeep S Mehta is the Secretary General, CUTS International and Purushendra Singh, Visiting Fellow, CUTS International.
