How long the US and Israeli air campaign against Iran lasts will, as it should, depend on when the mission’s aim has been achieved. But exactly what that aim is remains somewhat vague. The use of military force is the gravest of decisions a political leader can make, but the justification posted on social media by US President Donald Trump made reference to “imminent threats from the Iranian regime” without saying what those threats were. The United States ambassador to the United Nations claimed that the mission’s aims were to “dismantle missile capabilities”, “degrade” Iran’s navy, to “disrupt” Iran’s ability to arm proxy forces and to ensure that Iran could not threaten the world with a nuclear weapon.
The real aim of the campaign though, appeared to come at the end of Trump’s video when he said: “Finally, to the great, proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand…when we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.” This was a clear call to arms for the Iranian people with the intent of changing the regime.
There is, however, a disconnect between Trump’s aim for regime change and the ways and means of trying to achieve it. With the US announcement of the death of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s theocratic succession process is now being tested for only the second time. Given Khamenei’s age, discussions about succession were widespread. But the system for appointing a new leader was certainly not designed for such circumstances. New ground is being traversed and the theocratic governance structure is under unprecedented pressure.
The Iranian Constitution allows for an interim leadership council – the president, the head of the judiciary and a cleric from the Council of Guardians – to assume control until a new Supreme Leader is appointed. There will be the utmost urgency in ensuring the interim arrangement is in place. The regime will understand that it needs to avoid any sense of a power vacuum and that the system’s continuity is assured and advertised.
External leadership aspirants have been busily building their profile in the hope of riding the wave of US military might to power. The real threat to the Iranian regime though, is not from the slick PR machine that touts the leadership potential of Reza Pahlavi, whose only credentials are being the son of the former Shah whose rule was so disliked that a broad-based popular revolution unseated him in 1979. Nor is it from the Albanian-based and rather cult-like People’s Mujahideen of Iran. Exile groups and individuals lose contact and a feel for the concerns of those left behind, and it is only natural that those inside the country who have suffered over the decades want to be in charge, rather than wealthy exiles resident in Europe and the United States.
Any viable regime change must come from the people within Iran, and a new government must also be headed by someone from within. Therein lies the rub, as the regime has been ruthless over the years in suppressing dissent and preventing the emergence of just such a person. With external leadership pretenders lacking domestic legitimacy, and independent internal candidates lacking the ability to organise, the options for regime change from within Iran imposed via an air campaign are limited in the extreme.
It may well be that Washington has a well-thought through plan for a legitimate post-revolutionary governance structure but their track record is poor in this regard. Alternatively, they may be satisfied with the emergence of a group of more pragmatic, less ideologically rigid leaders to fill out the new regime’s positions of authority. A leadership that is less threatening to the region and who will give up any nuclear aspirations. It is a big ask for the current government and security apparatus to do this though, because without its ideological underpinnings, the revolutionary Shi’a Islamist project is nothing. A more pragmatic ruler and ruling clique may be possible following the demise of Khamenei. Whether there is the desire, willingness or even ability to reform the current theocratic system while still maintaining its Shi’a Islamic character is another question altogether.
For true believers of the Shi’a project, resistance against overwhelming odds is a foundational narrative of the Shi’a faith. To what degree the unpopular regime is able to harness this into a kind of religio-nationalist sentiment sufficient to absorb the punishment meted out by the air campaign, or whether its stocks are so low that people seek to hasten its end regardless of the cost, will define whether Trump’s high risk-high reward move results in the collapse of the Islamic Republic or whether it hardens its resolve to survive and simply results in a recalibration of its immediate strategic direction.
Dr Rodger Shanahan is a Middle East analyst, author and former Army officer.
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