Four years ago, on February 24 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that his forces had begun a full-scale invasion of Ukraine – the reasons for which we have explored here. Within minutes, explosions were heard in major Ukrainian cities as Russian troops flooded across the border.
Russian forces made swift gains, capturing key areas near the capital of Kyiv. But the offensive soon stalled and, by December, Russia had been forced to withdraw its forces and consolidate in the east where the war has ground on ever since.
We asked Stefan Wolff, Tetyana Malyarenko, Scott Lucas and Mark Webber, four regular contributors to the Conversation UK’s coverage of Ukraine, for their take on the most surprising development of the war so far and its likely trajectory from here.
Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham; Tetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Security, and Jean Monnet, Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy
For us, the most surprising development remains Moscow’s decision to launch a large-scale ground invasion of Ukraine in the first place. Even though many Russian and western analysts expected a swift Ukrainian defeat, this always seemed unlikely from the perspective of Ukraine.
The mobilisation of Ukrainian society early on in the war testified to this and underlined that there was no realistic scenario under which the Kremlin could swiftly achieve its goals – to oust President Volodymyr Zelensky and “demilitarise” and “denazify” Ukraine.
Much less surprising was Russia’s transition to a war economy and a traditional war of attrition, which became a foregone conclusion as soon as Moscow’s plan for a victory parade in Kyiv within weeks of the full-scale invasion turned out to be a pipe dream.
Combat methods have evolved over the past four years, especially regarding the integration of drones. Russia has exploited drone technology to attack the whole range of critical infrastructure in Ukraine, not just military targets. But the foundation of Russian and then Soviet military doctrine – the use of mass armies and tactics of mass destruction – has remained untouched.
Moving forward, both sides have sufficient resources and external support to maintain the status quo. They will continue to fight each other in the hope of exhausting their opponent. But neither side is likely to reach this point of exhaustion soon. And until it does happen, political, economic and social stagnation in both Russia and Ukraine will continue to take its toll on their citizens.
Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University College Dublin
On the day the war broke out, I was in a discussion group of political and military analysts. When we got the news that Russian special forces had landed at the Hostomel airbase near Kyiv, each of us thought the capital would fall within a few weeks.
However, four years have passed and Ukraine now controls more territory than it did in June 2022. This is despite facing the second-most powerful military in the world, Russia’s disinformation assault and political warfare trying to split Europe, and abandonment by the Trump camp.
The Russian president’s unwillingness to give up his quest for Ukraine as part of a “Greater Russia” and the Trump camp’s willingness to sacrifice Ukrainian and European security are less of a surprise.
Putin made clear in an essay in 2021 that this would be his legacy project. So any soundbites about “peace around the corner” – particularly from Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – are cynical declarations or wishful thinking.
