Colby opted for a classic liberal arts degree at Harvard University, majoring in history and political and moral theory, where he studied alongside the political philosopher Harvey Mansfield, whom he admires.
This background remains a point of pride, and he harbours a slight disdain for the tight-knit – some would say cloistered – world of foreign relations and national security experts.
“I don’t identify as a member of the national security community,” Colby told the Intercollegiate Studies Institute last year.
“Where’s their source of intellectual and moral confidence? I don’t think you’re going to find that just by reading the latest textbook on international relations theory.”
Later in college, he gravitated toward Cold War history. He graduated and began work in government shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. The experience afforded him a “peanut gallery view” of a pivotal moment in American history, including as a staffer on a commission looking into why US intelligence on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction was wrong.
Colby obtained a law degree from Yale University, but decided it wasn’t his calling. His interest is in national security and foreign affairs strategy – concepts, rather than operations or the day-to-day minutiae.
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“I think I’ve always had – it sounds a little ridiculous – but sort of a maverick mindset,” he told the ISI. “I don’t think one should be contrarian. Being able to think for yourself and on your own is good.”
In the first Trump administration, Colby served as principal adviser to the defence secretary on defence and foreign policy, and led the development of the 2018 National Defence Strategy, which shifted the US’s focus to China.
Now he has been tasked with creating a 2025 version.
Book of revelations
In his 2021 book, The Strategy of Denial, Colby said the US’s top strategic priority was to act as an “external cornerstone balancer” for a strong coalition that can frustrate China’s desire for hegemonic power in Asia.
The best way to do this, Colby contends, is through a “denial defence.” The US’s goal is not to dominate China militarily, but to deny it the ability to achieve its objectives – peeling off an ally, or seizing or holding an ally’s territory.
This strategy can only work “if the United States and its allies and partners apply the needed level of effort and focus,” he wrote.
The most obvious of Beijing’s targets is Taiwan, which it sees as part of China. For years, Washington’s foreign policy establishment has fixated on the notion – suggested by then INDOPACOM commander Phil Davidson in 2021 – that China wants to be ready to attack in 2027, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army.
This masthead and the Financial Times have reported that Colby is asking Australia – and Japan – to make clear commitments about what they would do in the event of a conflict with China over Taiwan. That includes how Australia would use the nuclear-powered submarines it buys from the US under AUKUS.
How Canberra handles this will be critically important to the ongoing relationship with Beijing.
While Prime Minister Anthony Albanese enjoyed a relatively cozy visit to China last week – even lunching with Chinese President Xi Jinping – Colby’s demands loomed over the pomp and ceremony of the trip. He has quickly shifted from relative obscurity to playing a key role in the future of the Australia-China relationship.
Meanwhile, a senior US defence official told this masthead that while public reporting had focused on Taiwan, US concerns were broader than that. There are clues in Colby’s book as to what that entails.
He writes that the Philippines is likely to be Beijing’s second-best target among US allies. He identifies Australia and Japan as two allies with the capacity to contribute significantly to the collective defence of both Taiwan and the Philippines.
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Colby views US allies in the region as vital, but he is also wary of their willingness to contribute and commit to collective defence. Specifically, he says Australia, Japan and South Korea may resist formally committing to the defence of Taiwan and the Philippines.
He supports the alliance with Australia, noting it has an advanced economy, capable military and is relatively easy to defend due to its distance from China. But Colby also observes that if China dominated South-East Asia, it would make it far more painful, challenging and risky for the US and others to defend Australia.
“The US should therefore seek to enlist Canberra to prepare its forces to aid US efforts to defend the Philippines and Taiwan,” he wrote in the book, and noted Australia was already heading in that direction.
Courting controversy
Part of Colby’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and containing China means focusing US resources there. He is sceptical about deploying weapons in other conflicts, including Ukraine, and is one of the driving forces behind the latest push for NATO members to lift their defence spending and take care of their own backyard.
Colby’s recent attempt to halt arms for Ukraine was controversial. The Wall Street Journal reported he wrote a memo in early June outlining how Ukraine’s request for more weapons “could further stretch already depleted Pentagon stockpiles.”
Has Elbridge Colby overplayed his hand with US President Donald Trump?Credit: AP
But Trump reversed the decision and committed new Patriot missile defence systems to Kyiv (paid for by Europe, he said).
Many in Washington see this episode as Colby “overplaying his hand” – freelancing – even though Hegseth was ultimately responsible for the decision, and reportedly failed to tell the White House in advance.
There are also tensions between Defence and the State Department, which was surprised by the AUKUS review. When the review became public, the department sent its diplomats a message “We are not aware of a review of the AUKUS agreement.”
A recent story by Politico unveiled the depth of tensions between Colby and the government. “He is pissing off just about everyone I know inside the administration,” one person familiar with the situation told the outlet.
Some believe Colby is now in a weaker position. However, as one well-connected source told this masthead: “It would be a mistake on the Australian side to think he’s going to go away.”
On Friday, Australian ambassador to the US Kevin Rudd told the Aspen Security Forum that Australia was working with Colby and his team on the AUKUS review and was confident of working through each of the issues Colby raised. He indicated they were familiar with each other.
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“‘Bridge’ has been round to my place a lot of times,” Rudd said. “We have known each other for a long period of time.”
Former ambassador Arthur Sinodinos, now with the Asia Group and a co-chair of the AUKUS Forum, says it’s important to remember Colby is not a think-tank person seeking to apply theoretical views to the real world.
“He has an extensive background in defence strategy, force development and planning, which means he is a serious player in shaping current defence priorities, including on AUKUS,” Sinodinos says.
United States Studies Centre chief executive Mike Green, who was on the National Security Council staff from 2001 to 2005, says Colby has made his mark in foreign policy circles by pushing hardest to make the difficult choices many people know are necessary.
Part of his success, but also potentially his failure, is that the Trump administration has diminished the usual bureaucratic processes that co-ordinate policy development, such as the NSC.
“So there’s much more space for policy entrepreneurs to push their agenda, and ‘Bridge’ is clearly doing that,” Green says.
“He’s seized by urgency, and he’s reducing these hard choices down to stark choices, but without the very important interagency process to consider the consequences.”
Green says Australia and other allies will likely have to deal with more of this pressure. “But I don’t think it changes the fundamental interests of the United States and key stakeholders to move forward with AUKUS.”
