Beyond Borders: China’s Arctic Ambitions Take Flight

China’s northernmost point lies at the 52nd parallel north, equivalent to the latitude of Bryansk and Samara Oblasts. Conversely, its southernmost point, as per China’s official stance, is Zenmuan Sha Reef, merely 500 km north of the equator. Predominantly situated in a subtropical climate zone, China’s geographical makeup doesn’t naturally align with the Arctic. Nevertheless, Beijing’s vocal assertions in recent decades depict it as a significant player in the Arctic “great game.” The burgeoning collaboration between Russia and China in the region mutually benefits both nations. However, Moscow and Beijing’s perspectives on the Arctic’s essence and governance significantly diverge.

Historically, the Chinese displayed lukewarm interest in territories north of the Great Wall. In the 1st century, historian Ban Gu wrote, “Chinese lands lie at the center of what the sun and moon illuminate, hence all living things thrive here in full abundance. Barbarian lands, however, lie at the periphery, and the vitality of things there is impaired.”

In the quest to comprehend Russia and China’s actions in the Arctic, the United States seeks answers.

Arguably, the furthest north any Chinese explorer ventured was Ishiha, a Tungus official, whose 1410 expedition traversed the Amur to its mouth. Erecting a Buddhist temple and stele on one of the river’s cliffs, the Chinese were swiftly expelled upon Russia’s arrival, leaving their constructions abandoned until the Russians arrived.

China refrained from venturing further north, missing out on the Age of Discovery and subsequent colonization of remote, underdeveloped territories. However, in the 21st century, it became evident that the “peripheral lands” were not as barren as haughty Han philosophers believed two millennia ago.

The Arctic region garners Beijing’s interest for several reasons, primarily as a source of natural resources. With China facing shortages within its borders, the Arctic represents a potential solution.

The exact wealth of Arctic deposits remains uncertain, but it’s clear they constitute a significant percentage of global hydrocarbon reserves, particularly natural gas, alongside substantial volumes of rare earth metals vital for “green technologies.”

The second factor driving China’s interest is the Northern Sea Route (NSR). China seeks to mitigate the risk posed by maritime chokepoints vulnerable to US naval blockades, hence its push for transcontinental land logistics development across Eurasia and emphasis on NSR transit. Moreover, the route from China to Europe via the Arctic Ocean is shorter than through the Indian Ocean (approximately 30-40%), with ice melt prolonging the navigation season.

Finally, Beijing’s Arctic interest harbors a military-strategic undertone, aiming to prevent US expansion in the region in tandem with Russia.

China’s Arctic policy can be traced back to the 1980s with the establishment of the Polar Research Institute in Shanghai. Since then, China gradually expanded its presence and activities in the region, from acquiring its first icebreaker in 1994 to establishing its first research station in Svalbard in 2003, culminating in the launch of the domestically-built icebreaker “Snow Dragon – 2” in 2019.

This Arctic endeavor falls under the Belt and Road Initiative promoted by China, with the Arctic serving as a critical component of this vision. Notable events in this context include China attaining observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, the publication of the “Arctic White Paper” in 2018 outlining China’s policy in the region, and the commissioning of the icebreaker “Snow Dragon – 2” in 2019.

China appears steadfast in advancing its objectives and enhancing its presence in the Arctic. Despite its geographical remoteness from these regions, China perceives strategic and economic opportunities therein that must be leveraged.

China’s position on the Arctic is not unique. Other countries located far from the Arctic Circle, for example, Great Britain, France, India, Japan, South Korea and even Poland, also want to expand their presence in the region. However, as usual, it is China’s activity that causes the greatest concern and suspicion.

For Russia, given the current problems in relations with other members of the Arctic Council (USA, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland), as well as the need for investment and technology to develop its part of the Arctic, the interest in interaction with China is obvious. But this does not negate the fact that Moscow and Beijing fundamentally disagree in their understanding of what the Arctic is and who has priority in its development.

In 1997, Russia joined the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (all Arctic states signed it, with the exception of the United States). Since then, our country has proceeded from the fact that all coastal Arctic states have their own jurisdiction over the Arctic shelf and an exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean with a width of 200 nautical miles. Thus, all the natural resources of the Arctic within these zones are divided between these countries. Moreover, the convention gives them the right to claim further expansion of the shelf if they prove that the underwater ridges are a continuation of their continental platforms (Russia claims recognition of its jurisdiction over 1.2 million sq. km of Arctic space, since they are a natural continuation of the continental shelf of Siberia).

And although now Russia no longer adheres so strictly to the sectoral approach, it is obvious that our country is promoting an understanding of the Arctic as, first of all, the property of the Arctic powers, including by assigning the Arctic Council the role of a key regional association coordinating international activities in the region.

China proceeds from the fact that the Arctic is the heritage of all humanity, and not just the Arctic states. Beijing insists that in this sense the Arctic is similar to Antarctica, which has no state borders and is open to researchers from all over the world.

The PRC is trying to emphasize this understanding of the essence of the region by organizing scientific research in the Arctic. Chinese scientists are conducting research in Arctic geology, hydrology, biology and other disciplines at the forefront of basic science. Particular attention is paid to the problems of melting ice and climate change, which is easily explained – it is believed that China will be among the countries that will suffer the most from global warming.

For example, in addition to the purely Chinese research base in Spitsbergen, in the north of Iceland, in Karhall, a joint Icelandic-Chinese Arctic Observatory has been operating since 2018.

However, it is difficult to get rid of the feeling that regional research is not a goal for Beijing, but a means to penetrate a kind of “Arctic club.” This assessment is largely explained by the fact that China has not just an abstract interest in the Arctic, driven by considerations of national prestige, but also specific resources for dividing and developing the “global commons.” And the only question is how to justify your right to a piece of the “Arctic pie.”

In general, efforts in the Arctic sector fit well into the overall outline of Beijing’s intensified foreign policy, which began after Xi Jinping came to power. Now China not only claims to have a position in the system of international relations that corresponds to the achievements of its culture and economy, but also to determine what exactly the new world order will be.

An example here is the PRC’s attempts to influence the language used to describe international relations in the Arctic. For this purpose, new terms are introduced. The two key concepts that China uses today to describe its status in the Arctic are a near-Arctic state and an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs. After the publication of the Chinese White Paper on the Arctic in 2018, both terms became official and began to be widely used on international platforms. First in the mouths of the Chinese speakers, but then gradually by everyone else (comparable processes: the displacement of the historical term Manchuria by the term Northeast China, the use of Xizang instead of the commonly used Tibet, and so on).

It is clear that “whatever you call the boat, that’s how it will float.” If everyone in the world gradually gets used to the fact that in addition to the “Arctic powers” there are also some near-Arctic ones – those who, despite the “common interests of mankind in the Arctic”, still have more rights than non-Arctic ones – then this will justify the rights of the PRC to participate in the development of the region.

In addition, Beijing emphasizes that it, having a powerful economy and the responsibility of a great power (another foreign policy concept of the Xi Jinping era), should play a special role in maintaining the environmental sustainability of the Arctic and facilitating access to natural resources belonging to the whole world. Expanding China’s participation in Arctic affairs is thus positioned as beneficial for all humanity.

Already having observer status in the Arctic Council, Beijing is trying to play the game not only on a practical, but also on an ideological level, building a certain system of images around its presence in the region. The use of the above terms is intended to rid the PRC of the reputation of an overly ambitious outsider and at the same time influence the formation of the agenda, taking into account Chinese interests.

In this regard, Beijing’s actions differ from what, say, Japan or Korea can afford. Both of these countries have virtually no influence on world discourse and are only capable of improving their status within the framework that was determined before them and for them. China is striving not only to succeed in the game according to the old rules, but also to establish new ones.

Are these rules beneficial to us? Considering that Beijing does not dispute the priority of Russia’s interests in the Arctic region, in general the answer is positive. China views Russia as a key partner in terms of exploiting the Northern Sea Route and gaining access to the natural resources of the Arctic shelf. For Russia, in many areas of regional development that require investment and technology, China as a partner now simply has no alternative. And the strengthening of the PRC in the region, no matter how paradoxical it may sound, strengthens Russia. And although in the future the fundamental difference in the positions of the two countries regarding the essence of the Arctic is unlikely to disappear, this should not be an obstacle to establishing a mutually beneficial partnership here and now.