The next war nobody wants: Can Israel and Turkey avoid a conflict?
Israel sees a Turkish-backed Syrian military as a potential strategic threat while Turkey sees Israeli attacks as an attempt to constrain Turkey’s desire for a role in a neighboring country. Neither side appears to want a war, yet the possibility of a direct clash has become harder to dismiss because the two countries could now find their forces operating in the same battlespace.
Turkey appears to be escalating the Israeli air strikes issue. Turkish media outlet Daily Sabah reported today that Turkish justice ministry has requested that Interpol red notices be issued for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over alleged genocide charges linked to an attack on activists aboard the Global Sumud Flotilla a few months ago.
Abu al-Duhur changes the equation
On August 18, Israel carried out airstrikes against Abu al-Duhur, a former Syrian military airbase in northwestern Syria. The strikes hit the runway and other facilities though no casualties were reported. Israel subsequently confirmed that it had carried out the attack and said the objective was to prevent Turkey from establishing a military presence at the base.
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The Israeli justification is important. This was not presented as another strike in the long-running Israeli campaign against Iranian weapons transfers or Hezbollah infrastructure in Syria. Israel said it was acting against a prospective Turkish military deployment.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel had warned Syria against allowing a Turkish military presence to move southward in Syria. He described the Turkish entrenchment as a threat to Israel and said the strike was a message to Turkey. Defense Minister Israel Katz was even more explicit. He warned President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against what he called “dangerous adventures” in Syria and said Turkey should not test Israel’s resolve.Israel has frequently warned Syria, Iran and Hezbollah. But it is now issuing a comparable military warning directly to Turkey, a NATO member with one of the region’s largest armed forces.
The dispute over what happened at Abu al-Duhur has made the episode more complicated. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said Turkish officials had visited the facility and that Syria had explained to Israel that there was no plan to establish a permanent Turkish base there. Turkey’s Defense Ministry, however, said no Turkish military delegation had been at Abu al-Duhur before or during the Israeli attack.
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Even if the Turkish delegation account is ultimately proved wrong, the episode illustrates the danger. Israel is now monitoring Turkish military activity in Syria closely enough that even a routine Turkish visit to a Syrian military facility can become part of a much larger security crisis.
The real dispute is over post-Assad Syria
The airbase strikes are less important than what they represent. The government of Bashar al-Assad, who was supported by Iran and Russia, fell in late 2024, with Assad taking refuge in Russia. New government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda commander who is now allied with the US, subsequently emerged with Turkey as one of its most important external supporters. Turkey has provided political backing and has been involved in reconstruction and military assistance.
Turkey says its military cooperation with Syria involves training, expertise and support for the development of a unified Syrian military.
Israel sees the same process differently. Under Assad, Syria was an adversary, but its conventional military had been devastated by years of civil war. Israel had also developed a relatively established method of dealing with Iranian and Hezbollah activity on Syrian territory. Israeli aircraft could attack weapons transfers, missile facilities and Iranian-linked infrastructure while trying to keep the Syrian government itself from becoming the main target.
A Turkish-supported Syrian military could eventually create a different strategic environment. Turkey has a substantial conventional military, a large drone industry, sophisticated air capabilities and extensive experience operating inside Syria. It can provide training and military technology that could help turn Syria’s fragmented armed groups and depleted armed forces into a more coherent state military.
That is the long-term Israeli concern. The problem is not simply Turkish soldiers at Syrian airbases but the possibility that Turkey helps create a Syrian military capable of defending itself against Israeli airpower and eventually challenging Israel’s freedom of action.
An Israeli strategic assessment published by the Institute for Counter-Terrorism has described the possibility of Syria becoming effectively dependent on Turkey as a significant emerging concern. It has also warned that a Turkish role in Syria could increase the possibility of a direct Israeli-Turkish confrontation.
Why Turkey is different from Russia
There is an important historical comparison here. When Russia intervened militarily in Syria in 2015 against ISIS and other such groups in support of the Assad regime, Israel and Russia had fundamentally different interests. Russia wanted to preserve the Assad government and its own military position in Syria. Israel wanted to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from using Syrian territory to build military capabilities against Israel.
Yet the two governments managed to construct a practical relationship that allowed them to operate in the same airspace. Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin established mechanisms for military deconfliction. Israel retained considerable freedom to attack Iranian and Hezbollah targets while trying to avoid direct confrontation with Russian forces.
The relationship with Turkey is much harder. Russia was a powerful external actor in Syria, but it was not building a regional strategy around confronting Israel. But Erdogan’s government has become one of Israel’s most vocal regional opponents, particularly since the Gaza war. Turkey has backed Hamas politically, condemned Israeli military operations in exceptionally strong terms and increasingly treats Israel as a major obstacle to its preferred regional order.
A recent Brookings analysis argues that Turkey’s rivalry with Israel has become a structural constraint on Ankara’s regional strategy, with Syria emerging as the central test of Turkey’s regional influence. But the analysis cautions against interpreting Erdoğan’s nationalist, neo-Ottoman-tinged rhetoric as evidence that Turkey is pursuing a project of regional domination. Based on interviews with senior Turkish officials and diplomats, it portrays Ankara’s leadership as considerably more pragmatic and restrained than its public messaging suggests, with Turkey primarily seeking to manage instability around its borders and protect its core interests rather than build a new regional empire.
Turkey may not want a war with Israel but Israel increasingly doubts that Turkey’s long-term regional ambitions are compatible with Israeli security interests.
The Erdogan factor
The deterioration in relations did not begin with Israeli strikes on Abu al-Duhur airbase. Turkey and Israel experienced periods of cooperation and even restored full diplomatic relations in 2022 after years of hostility. Erdogan and Israeli leaders were again engaging diplomatically. But the relationship deteriorated sharply after October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the Gaza war that followed.
Erdogan has repeatedly described Israel in exceptionally hostile terms and has accused it of terrorism and genocide. Turkey has also supported Hamas diplomatically and allowed senior Hamas figures to operate from Turkish territory. The Israeli government now regards Erdogan’s policy as part of a broader campaign against Israel rather than merely criticism of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians.
The confrontation has continued to intensify in 2026. Netanyahu reportedly raised concerns about Erdogan with President Donald Trump before the NATO summit in Turkey, specifically warning about what Israel sees as Turkey’s increasingly hostile posture.
The rhetoric has also extended into questions surrounding Jerusalem. In June, a Turkish minister publicly spoke of his desire one day to serve as governor of Jerusalem and suggested that Jerusalem and other former Ottoman territories could eventually return to Turkish sovereignty. The remarks were widely interpreted in Israel as provocative.
There is also a growing ideological problem inside the new Syrian order. Reports have described Islamist and nationalist elements within Syria’s emerging security structures using intensely hostile rhetoric toward Israel. That does not mean al-Sharaa has decided to make Syria an anti-Israel military state. In fact, the evidence points in the opposite direction for now. Al-Sharaa has pursued contact with Israel and has said Syria wants a security agreement rather than a new war. His foreign minister has also continued discussing de-escalation with Israeli officials.
But Israel has to consider what Syria could become several years from now, not only what al-Sharaa says today.
A potentially stronger Syria worries Israel
This is where the comparison with Hezbollah becomes useful. Hezbollah in Syria was an enormous threat to Israel during the Assad era. It had large missile stocks, experienced fighters and extensive infrastructure in Lebanon and Syria. But Hezbollah remained a non-state organization. Israel could attack its infrastructure without automatically declaring war on a major state military.
A Turkish-backed Syrian army would be different. Turkey could help Syria rebuild conventional military capabilities. That could include drones, air defenses, command systems, intelligence capabilities and training. The strategic problem for Israel would then become a state-level military problem rather than simply a campaign against a militia.
There is another geographical point. Turkey does not necessarily need to put troops near the Golan Heights to influence Israel’s security environment. A network of Turkish-supported facilities in northern and central Syria could give Turkey substantial influence over the development of the Syrian military without a large Turkish force ever reaching southern Syria.
Israel therefore appears to be trying to establish its red lines before such a military infrastructure becomes entrenched. That helps explain why Abu al-Duhur was targeted even though the facility had been inactive for years. The airbase had not been operational for more than a decade and was being rehabilitated.
From Israel’s perspective, destroying a runway and hangars now may be easier than trying to remove Turkish-supported air-defense systems and Syrian military infrastructure later.
The risk is an accidental Israel-Turkey war
An open Israeli-Turkish war remains highly unlikely. Both governments have much to lose. Turkey does not want to fight Israel while dealing with Syria’s reconstruction and a complicated regional environment. Israel does not want to fight Turkey, a NATO member with a large conventional military. The US has strong relationships with both countries and has every reason to prevent such a conflict. It is already trying to make Israel and Turkey reach an understanding and build a mechanism to avoid future problems.
The more realistic danger is an unintended escalation. Consider the possible sequence. Turkey establishes a military presence at a Syrian facility and Israel decides the facility threatens its security and strikes it. Turkish personnel are killed even though Israel was not targeting them specifically. Turkey retaliates against Israeli aircraft or another Israeli target and Israel responds.
US special envoy Tom Barrack has said the US is working on a formal deconfliction mechanism involving Israel, Turkey and Syria. Reuters reported that Washington was concerned about misunderstandings and accidental confrontations after the Abu al-Duhur strike.
The fact that Washington is pushing for such a mechanism is itself significant. It indicates that American officials see the possibility of Israeli and Turkish forces operating close enough to one another in Syria to require dedicated military communications.
NATO makes the calculation more complicated
Turkey’s NATO membership adds another layer to the problem. Article 5 does not mean that every Israeli attack on Turkish personnel anywhere in the world automatically triggers a NATO military response. The legal and political circumstances too matter. Turkish forces operating inside Syria are not the same thing as an attack on Turkish territory.
This question has suddenly become a subject of public discussion in Israel. An opinion article in Israel Hayom argued that NATO’s collective-defense arrangements do not automatically extend to Turkish forces deployed in Syria. Another report on the article said Israeli strategists have been examining where Article 5 applies.
That should not be confused with an official Israeli declaration that Israel intends to attack Turkish troops because NATO would stay out. There is a major difference between an Israeli strategic discussion about the limits of Article 5 and an official decision to exploit those limits.
Still, the fact that the question is being discussed at all shows how dramatically the strategic environment has changed.
There is an additional complication. Turkey recently joined Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in a new defense agreement whose collective-defense language resembles NATO’s Article 5. The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7, just days before the Abu al-Duhur strike.
At this stage an Israel-Turkey war appears highly unlikely. The military, economic and diplomatic costs would be enormous and neither government appears to be seeking one. But a dangerous cycle of conflict triggered by some misunderstanding can’t be totally ruled out. For now, diplomacy still has room to prevent that.
